In our previous article,Argentina has Uranium. Now What?, we analyzed the local situation: the country’s reserves, why uranium production has been inactive for 30 years, and the obstacles hindering its development. But that question cannot be answered by looking inward alone. To understand Argentina’s potential role in the uranium value chain, it is first necessary to understand how that chain operates globally. In this article, we examine who controls the resource, who enriches it, who needs it, and which forces shape the market.
The Geopolitical Map of Uranium
Uranium has returned to the center of global geopolitics. Following the Fukushima accident in 2011, uranium prices collapsed. Now, more than a decade later, uranium is once again emerging as a key player in international energy competition.
This trend is reflected in the renewed interest from technology companies and several countries seeking to secure access to nuclear energy. A clear example is Microsoft’s initiative to support the restart of the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, United States. Meanwhile, China is on track to build 150 new nuclear reactors in the coming decades. The result will be a steadily increasing demand for uranium through 2040.
However, production from existing mines is expected to decline by half by 2030,according to the World Nuclear Association (WNA). This will create an urgent need to develop new uranium mines and reactivate those currently idle. It should also be noted that new uranium projects may take between 10 and 20 years to develop and require investments of several billion dollars.
A recent WNA report [1] outlines three possible scenarios for future uranium demand:
- In the reference scenario—based on the current objectives of governments and companies—demand would reach just over 150,000 tonnes of uranium by 2040.
- The high scenario, which assumes a more favorable context for nuclear expansion, exceeds 204,000 tonnes.
- The low scenario, constrained by delays or restrictive policies, is limited to around 107,000 tonnes.
While the report concludes that future demand can be met, it warns that this will only be possible if the mineral production increases in a timely manner.
From Deposit to Reactor: The Uranium Cycle
The uranium pathway consists of four main stages: exploration and mining of the ore; concentration to produce yellowcake, a yellow powder that is the first commercial product of the process; chemical conversion to transform the yellowcake into a gas known as uranium hexafluoride; and, finally, enrichment to reach the grade required by reactors. Any disruption at any of these stages affects the entire fuel cycle chain.
Each stage involves not only States, custodians of uranium reserves and energy security, but also a limited number of public and private companies that dominate key activities within the cycle. Among these, enrichment is the most critical stage from both a technological and security standpoint.
The result is a fragile supply chain with little redundancy.A political decision, an accident, or an economic crisis at any of these links has an immediate impact on the entire system, placing those who rely on fuel for their reactors in a situation of critical dependence.
What is uranium enrichment?
Natural uranium extracted from mines is composed primarily of two isotopes: uranium-238 (U-238) and uranium-235 (U-235). The latter is the fissile isotope, meaning it is capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction, but it accounts for only 0.7% of natural uranium extracted from mines. For a reactor to operate, this proportion must be increased to around 3–5%. In other words, the uranium must be enriched in U-235.
The technology currently used for enrichment is centrifugation, which requires thousands of centrifuges arranged in successive cascades to separate isotopes by exploiting their difference in mass. This technology is so complex and costly that only a few countries have mastered it. Moreover, the same centrifugation technology that produces low-enriched uranium (LEU) for civilian reactors could, in theory, be used to achieve enrichment levels suitable for non-civilian uses. This technological duality, known as dual use, is the reason why enrichment is subject to strict international controls1.
In this way, countries with uranium enrichment capabilities occupy a decisive position within the nuclear fuel supply chain. Possessing mineral reserves does not always guarantee strategic advantage; by contrast, having the technology required for enrichment does. Advancing along this path requires significant investment and highly complex technological processes that can take decades.
The global landscape can thus be divided into three groups: those that possess uranium, those that master the technology to enrich it, and those that possess neither the mineral nor the technology but require both to generate energy.
Supply: those who possess the mineral
The largest uranium reserves are located in Australia, Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, Russia, Niger, South Africa, China, Brazil, and Mongolia.
However, possessing uranium is not the same as producing it. Australia holds the largest reserves in the world, partly thanks to the Olympic Dam mine, but contributes only 9% of global production and does not generate nuclear energy domestically. Conflicts with Indigenous communities and political restrictions limit its exploitation. Niger, for its part, has vast reserves, but political instability and the 2023 coup have disrupted its production.
As a result, nearly 80% of global uranium production is concentrated in just four countries: Kazakhstan, which alone produces 43% of the world’s uranium (more than the next three countries combined); Canada, which contributes 15%, mainly from high-grade deposits in the Athabasca Basin; Namibia, which accounts for 11%, from large-scale open-pit operations in the Namib Desert; and Australia, which, despite holding 28% of global uranium reserves, contributes only 9%. The remaining 22% is largely distributed among Uzbekistan, Russia, China, Niger, India, and South Africa [2][3].
Demand: those who need it
This oligopoly of uranium reserves and production shapes, in a complex way, the commercial relationships among interested countries. Those with large fleets of nuclear power plants require substantial amounts of uranium that they generally do not possess, and must therefore negotiate with producing countries.
Among the largest uranium consumers is the United States, which operates the world’s largest fleet of nuclear reactors. Its 93 reactors consume approximately 20,000 tonnes of uranium per year. Although domestic production increased significantly in 2024, it covered only about 8% of annual demand2. The remainder was imported, primarily from Canada, Kazakhstan, and Australia, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2025 Uranium Marketing Report [4].
On the other side of the world, China has 61 operating reactors, 38 under construction, and a further 150 planned by 2035. It currently produces only approximately 1,500 tonnes per year out of the roughly 13,000 tonnes it consumes; however, with this projected expansion, uranium demand is expected to reach 40,000 tonnes annually.
The solution adopted by China has been to participate in mining projects in Namibia, Niger, and Kazakhstan, while also securing long-term import agreements with Russia and Uzbekistan. In 2024, it acquired stakes in uranium projects in Kazakhstan that had previously belonged to Rosatom, consolidating its position as the largest economic actor in uranium mining in that country. In Namibia, the Husab mine, operated with Chinese capital, produces nearly 7% of the world’s uranium. This reflects a systematic approach to securing resources, not only by purchasing uranium but also by strategically investing in the mines that produce it. Unlike the Western world, China has the capacity to reduce both the costs and timelines of uranium production3.
In Europe, France operates 57 reactors and has an energy mix that relies on nuclear power for approximately 70% of its electricity. Its plants consume around 8,000 tonnes of uranium per year, yet the country no longer has active mines within its territory, forcing it to source 100% of the mineral abroad. For decades, France controlled its supply through its former African colonies in Niger and, previously, Gabon. Following the collapse of French influence in these countries, that model has become increasingly weakened. Today, France is seeking to diversify its supply toward Kazakhstan, Canada, and Namibia.
This imbalance between supply and demand requires complex negotiations among countries whose interests are not always aligned.
But the issue does not end there. To this complex web of agreements, geographic conditions, and projections, one must also add the corporate world: that handful of companies that control not only the uranium market, but also the different stages of the uranium cycle.
Corporate control: production and enrichment
If we look at the companies involved in uranium production, the market is concentrated in five major firms [5].
The list is led by Kazatomprom, with a 21% share of global uranium extraction. This state-owned company from Kazakhstan controls the second-largest uranium reserves in the world. Its decisions and fluctuations have an immediate impact on the market.
In second place is Cameco, with a 17% share; a Canadian company and the only publicly traded firm in the West dedicated exclusively to uranium. It controls the richest deposits in the Athabasca Basin, where extracted ore contains between 15% and 20% uranium, compared to a global average of 0.1%. Over the last period, Cameco’s stock has increased twentyfold.
For its part, Orano, the French company, is perhaps the most integrated player operating across all stages of the cycle in the Western world: it conducts mining in Canada, Niger, and Kazakhstan; conversion and enrichment in France; and participates in fuel fabrication as well as radioactive waste management. It is one of the few companies capable of extracting uranium and producing finished fuel assemblies. In 2024, it accounted for approximately 11% of global uranium production.
On the Eastern side are the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom. The former, state-owned, manages the entire Chinese nuclear ecosystem: reactors, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. Its international subsidiary, CGN, systematically acquires uranium assets in Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, Rosatom, like Orano, controls the full fuel cycle, but is entirely state-owned and operated. Each accounts for around 10% of global uranium production.
As for enrichment, the most sensitive stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, four companies dominate the process worldwide:
• Rosatom (Russia, state-owned): 38%
• CNNC (China, state-owned): 20%
• Orano (France, mixed public-private): 15%
• Urenco Group (UK–German–Dutch consortium): 12%
This brings us to the crux of the issue: China and Russia together account for nearly 60% of global uranium enrichment capacity. For Western countries that depend on these services, this concentration poses a concrete supply challenge.
Western “dependence”
These tensions between suppliers and consumers are already manifesting in concrete measures. In 2024, the United States enacted the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, which gradually restricts the purchase of Russian-origin enriched uranium, with limited waivers in place until 2028. Months later, Russia temporarily restricted its exports of enriched uranium to the United States.
This exposes a structural vulnerability in the U.S. nuclear supply chain. Despite increasing domestic production in recent years, current capabilities are insufficient to sustain an autonomous nuclear supply chain [6]. In a context of growing trade tensions with China and Russia, this limitation takes on a strategic dimension.
In Europe, dependence on Russia extends beyond uranium. Many reactors in Eastern Europe rely on Russian engineering and can only operate with fuel assemblies of Russian design, making a transition to alternative suppliers difficult in the short term. As a result, Europe cannot dispense with Russian nuclear fuel.
In the broader picture, the most concerning factor is the projected depletion of current uranium mines over the next two decades. This scenario further complicates matters for countries that import most of their uranium. Hence the growing interest in new territories with untapped reserves, increased influence over existing suppliers, and the reactivation of mines and enrichment facilities that were shut down in past decades.
Risk of deficit
More than 100 planned reactors in China and a growing global interest in small modular reactors (SMRs) point to a significant increase in uranium demand. This outlook creates a global alert scenario regarding the future availability of uranium. The question is whether there will be sufficient supply to meet this demand.
The answer is not straightforward. The uranium production cycle can take decades, and many mining projects that would have ensured projected supply were abandoned following the Fukushima accident. Exploration that should have taken place in the 2010s, for example, was halted due to a sharp drop in prices. In other words, an entire cycle of investment, exploration, and development was interrupted.
From a geopolitical perspective, Western countries are facing a delicate situation, particularly the United States and France. To sustain their nuclear industries, both countries depend almost entirely on resources from countries where Russian and Chinese commercial presence is increasingly dominant.
A complex geopolitical chessboard is thus emerging, with countries seeking alliances, resources, self-sufficiency, and influence over strategically important territories. Competition to secure stable sources of supply, develop domestic capabilities, and participate in the value chain will be one of the defining features of this century’s geopolitical agenda.
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Translated into English by Tamara Dayoub.
References
[1] World Nuclear Fuel Report: Global scenarios for demand and supply availability 2025–2040, presented at the 50th World Nuclear Symposium – United Kingdom – 2025.
[2] Uranium Resources, Production and Demand (Red Book), NEA.
[3] https://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/
[6] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64444
Notes
- The main control mechanism is the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under this system, States Parties must declare their nuclear materials and facilities, which are then subject to periodic inspections by the IAEA to verify that they are not diverted from peaceful uses. It is a verification system, not an authorization regime, as the IAEA does not prohibit enrichment but rather ensures that it is carried out in accordance with declared purposes. ↩︎
- According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2024) domestic uranium production report, output increased from around 23 tonnes in 2023 to more than 300 tonnes in 2024 (the highest level in six years) driven by the reopening of mines in Wyoming, Texas, and Utah. In addition, in January 2026, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced a $2.7 billion investment to rebuild domestic enrichment capabilities. ↩︎
- At present, China appears to be better positioned than Western powers to accelerate the development of new mining projects, not necessarily due to a decisive extractive advantage, but because of a combination of state financing, industrial coordination, risk tolerance, and the ability to secure infrastructure and long-term demand. The IEA (International Energy Agency) estimates that, on average, a mine takes more than 16 years from discovery to first production. In the United States, a study cited by Reuters and S&P Global raises that average to nearly 29 years. In contrast, China often has an advantage, as its state-owned enterprises can move more quickly in countries where political approval, financing, and infrastructure are resolved in a more centralized manner or with less litigation than in the West. ↩︎