Throughout 2025, debate in Argentina surrounding the development of domestic uranium mining activity regained momentum. However, there is still limited discussion of the country’s technical, productive, logistical, and financial capacity to leverage a resource that, in the current geopolitical context, is becoming increasingly strategic. Against this backdrop, the question arises whether Argentina can extract uranium — and for what purpose.

Understanding uranium resources

Before examining the country’s uranium resources, it is necessary to clarify that the term “resources” encompasses different categories reflecting both the degree of geological knowledge and the economic viability of extraction.

On this basis, according to the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), identified resources comprise deposits whose existence has been demonstrated through geological surveys. Within this category there are reasonably assured resources, with a higher degree of certainty, and inferred resources, with a lower degree of certainty. These are expressed as a function of their recovery cost, representing the fraction that can be extracted in a technically and economically viable manner using current technologies at different cost thresholds (for example, below USD 40, 80, 130, or 260 per kilogram of uranium).

Undiscovered resources, in turn, comprise those that could potentially exist but have not yet been identified or quantified with precision.

Resources in Argentina

According to data provided by the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) as of 2024, Argentina has approximately 33,650 tonnes of uranium (tU) classified as identified resources recoverable at a production costs below 130 USD/kgU.

However, despite having these resources, the country has relied on uranium imports to meet domestic demand for the past 30 years — roughly 230 tU annually— to manufacture fuel for its nuclear power plants (Atucha I, Atucha II, and Embalse).

The decision to discontinue domestic uranium mining was consolidated in the 1990s when, in a context of economic reforms aimed at cost reduction, when Argentina chose to shut down its mining projects and meet demand through imports. The drop in prices following the Chernobyl accident was compounded by the impact of the Megatons to Megawatts program, which released large volumes of military-origin uranium onto the international market, keeping prices depressed. This global scenario made it more cost-effective to import the resource than to sustain domestic production, leading to a progressive decline in local mining activity until its total cessation in 1997.

Furthermore, regarding undiscovered resources, it is important to clarify that said status does not imply their non-existence, but rather the lack of sufficient geological and metallogenic studies to confirm their magnitude and economic viability. Accordingly, some sources estimate that Argentina may hold approximately 80,000 tU of such resources.

Argentina and the possibilities of the market

While Argentina has identified resources, their volume is far from competing with those of the leading uranium-holding countries. The world ranking is headed by Australia, which far exceeds other countries with close to 1.7 million tU. It is followed by Kazakhstan(the leading producer) with around 800,000 tU and Canadawith 600,000 tU. Other countries with significant resources include Russia, Namibia, and South Africa.

In the regional context, according to Red Book 2024 data, Brazil has approximately 167,000 tU — an order of magnitude greater than Argentina’s identified resources. This difference means that, at least in terms of reserve volume, Argentina does not rank among the world’s major players.

Hence, if both identified and undiscovered resources are combined, in quantitative terms, national uranium reserves can be considered marginal within the global context. If Argentina plays only a marginal role internationally in terms of uranium resources, it is worth considering whether the sector attracts international interest — and in what form. In particular, it invites consideration of the role of the United States, and whether it seeks to play a significant role as an investor driving local development, or rather as a strategic buyer interested in securing small global reserves that may temporarily help diversify its supply.

On the other hand, at the domestic level there are currently no consistent projections regarding the future evolution of uranium demand. Based on current data, the country requires approximately 230 tU per year to operate its nuclear power plants. Thus, the weighted average cost of imported natural uranium, including transport, insurance, and taxes, falls in the range of USD 200 per kilogram of uranium, representing an annual expenditure of over USD 40 million.

Development of a uranium project: global timelines and the Argentine reality

The development of a uranium mining project, from discovery to production, can take between 10 and 20 years depending on multiple factors such as geological conditions, regulatory framework, national infrastructure, and extraction method (open-pit mining, underground mining, in-situ leaching). The main stages of mining development include exploration, technical resource estimation, pre-feasibility studies, environmental, social, and regulatory permits, mine and concentration plant engineering, mine construction, ancillary infrastructure, commissioning, and transition to commercial production.

If all factors are aligned, development can be accelerated, but timelines remain long. In countries with stringent regulatory frameworks, legislative gaps, or political disputes, the permitting phase can represent a significant share of the overall timeline. In Argentina, these timelines tend to be further extended due to the intermittent nature of mining policies, the lack of sustained investment in exploration, and the regulatory uncertainty associated with provincial restrictions.

The costs of uranium projects vary significantly depending on the extraction method and the quality of the deposit. In-situ leaching (ISL) operations typically require lower upfront investments and more limited infrastructure, while open-pit or underground projects, which involve processing plants and greater removal and treatment activities, tend to present higher costs. Process efficiency, ore grade, and effective recovery are decisive factors in the economic viability of each project. These are further compounded by operating, environmental, and regulatory costs, bringing the total investment to hundreds of millions of dollars. In Argentina, ISL has not yet been implemented on an industrial scale; national experience has been limited to conventional open-pit or underground mining methods.

In addition to the national economic, technical, and regulatory challenges, the private sector has historically been sidelined from uranium mining. The former Mining Regime (Decree-Law 22,477/56), enacted in 1956, granted CNEA full control over nuclear minerals, with the aim of ensuring self-sufficiency and maintaining strategic control of the resource. Private actors could only operate through contracts with the Commission, which also acted as the sole purchaser of the mineral produced. This contractual regime failed to generate sufficient incentives to promote the discovery of new deposits and, in conjunction with various economic factors, led to a progressive deterioration of uranium mining activity over the four decades following its implementation. In this context, private sector participation in the capacity of contractors was reduced almost entirely, while prospecting, exploration, and mining activities became progressively concentrated within CNEA.

This legal regime was amended by the 1995 reform of the Mining Code, which ultimately reclassified nuclear minerals as concessionable resources that could be granted to private actors.

Current projects

According to data from the Mining Secretariat, there are currently seventeen declared uranium projects in the country, although many of them remain at the prospecting or early exploration stage. Their mere inclusion in official registries does not imply that all are technically or economically viable, nor that their development can be justified in the short term. Consequently, it is expected that only a portion of these projects will advance to more mature stages and that not all will effectively reach the production phase.

Among these, the most advanced or promising projects are Amarillo Grande, at the preliminary economic assessment stage (province of Rio Negro); Cerro Solo, at the advanced exploration stage (province of Chubut); and the Sierra Pintada Mining Complex, at the feasibility stage (province of Mendoza). The latter represents a paradigmatic case, as it is the only complex holding a licence granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which in 2024 issued a long-term shutdown licence.

Given the context described thus far, a series of questions arise regarding the country’s approach to uranium. Can Argentina mine uranium? Is it advisable to do so? To what end? While there are no definitive answers, we will attempt to outline some key considerations.

The question of feasibility

Under current conditions, in the absence of a clearly defined roadmap, it is difficult for a sustainable Argentine uranium sector to develop.

While prospecting and exploration activities can be carried out with adequate investment, the real challenge lies in implementing a nuclear policy that enables value addition the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.

This entails resolving still-pending issues linked to the early mining and industrial phases: the provincial infrastructure needed to supply mining-milling complexes; the siting of a concentration plant and its articulation with the conversion plant in Cordoba; the latter’s technological capacity to process increasing volumes; and the logistical constraints arising from crossing provinces that have declared themselves “non-nuclear,” such as La Pampa and San Luis.

In parallel, and as part of a broader discussion, it will be necessary to define the national strategy regarding uranium enrichment. This capital-intensive and technologically demanding process requires clarity on the future volume of uranium production and on the role Argentina intends to play in the higher-value-added stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.

From an economic perspective, while in the last century CNEA led uranium production through eight mining-milling complexes, it is now essential to promote partnerships with the private sector to drive the industry forward. Added to this is the fact that few domestic companies currently possess the technical capabilities and know-how necessary to participate in these types of developments.

From a regulatory standpoint, the current Mining Code establishes in Article 208 that the State shall have the right of first refusal to acquire, under market-standard price and terms, nuclear minerals produced in the country, as well as their concentrates and derivatives, in accordance with regulations to be issued by the Executive Branch. However, this prerogative has never been developed through secondary legislation. In practice, no procedures, deadlines, criteria, or competent authority have been defined for the exercise of this option. This lack of regulation creates an operational and legal vacuum that undemines sector’s predictability. In the absence of clear definitions governing the procedure for exercising the right of first refusal, the provision is, in practice, unenforceable. This indeterminacy introduces uncertainty both for project holders, who who lack clarity as to when or under what conditions the State might intervene, and for potential private investors, who lack a stable framework to assess commercial and regulatory risks.

Added to these issues is a complex regulatory landscape in which national and provincial regimes coexist, conditioning the development not only of uranium mining but of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. At the provincial level, jurisdictions such as Chubut and Mendoza maintain restrictive legislation that limits uranium mining activity, creating a scenario of regulatory asymmetries between jurisdictions¹.

Compounding this picture is the lack of public support in several provinces with uranium potential, the absence of a clear definition regarding environmental remediation liability in the absence of a national mine closure law, and the management of waste derived from uranium mining.

If these issues are not framed within an overarching objective to develop the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the uranium sector may develop, but only as an isolated enclave, disconnected from the rest of the nuclear sector and with a limited exploitation horizon.

Producing — for what purpose

Addressing these challenges first requires answering a fundamental question: why would Argentina mine its uranium resources. Among the possible answers, what first emerges is the opportunity to supply domestic demand. Second is the possibility of developing the stages that add value to uranium — for example, by increasing the capacity of the conversion plant or technologically adapting it to the demand of global buyers.

However, this will only be possible — and indeed represent an opportunity — if long-term sustainable policies are in place. The decision to move forward with these projects requires ensuring the continuity of exploration and mining activities, understood as part of a progressive and coordinated process that secures the future availability of resources. This means ensuring that the early stages of prospecting and evaluation effectively lead to production phases, thereby establishing a sustained, coordinated, and planned uranium development cycle in the country.

How could this begin?

Some ideas are put forward to begin defining a roadmap, as part of a systematic process, with the aim of contributing ideas on the what (to do) rather than the how (to do it):

1. Establish a Federal Nuclear Council: it is a priority to create a permanent institutionalized forum with representation from provinces that have potential across the various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear power generation. Such a body would enable the coordination of policies and the harmonization of technical and regulatory criteria, promoting a federal vision for nuclear development.
2. Advance the regulation of the Mining Code provision regarding the right of first refusal for nuclear minerals, as well as the enactment of a National Mine Closure Law, in order to provide greater predictability and legal certainty to the sector.
3. Promote strategic alliances between the State and the private sector: The technical knowledge accumulated — for example, at CNEA — can serve as a solid foundation for public-private partnerships that combine scientific expertise with the financial and operational capacity of domestic and international companies, thereby accelerating the reactivation of the nuclear fuel cycle.

To conclude

Ultimately, the question is not limited to whether Argentina can extract uranium, but rather for what purpose and under what development model. Reactivating uranium mining without a comprehensive policy that integrates exploration, value addition, environmental management, and social engagement will only lead to the same obstacles of the past.

The challenge, therefore, is to define whether the country aspires to a model of self-sufficiency and technological development, or whether it will be confined to a marginal role in the global supply of a strategic resource.

Notas

1. All Argentine provinces have either restricted or banned nuclear activities through local laws or constitutional amendments—openly contradicting the national legal framework, which grants the federal government authority over the sector. The roots of this phenomenon can be traced back to 1984, when the municipality of El Bolsón, in the province of Río Negro, declared itself a “Nuclear-Free Zone.” What began as a symbolic statement gradually evolved into a regulatory framework that now extends across the entire national territory. Nuclear Energy in Argentina and Its
   Political-Legal Crossroads, Thomas Viscovich, Gonzalo Aranda, 2025 ↩︎